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Introduction
Beginning with an abortive League of Nations proposal in 1927, interna-
tional organizations have periodically attempted to formulate rules relating
to the control of restrictive business practices (RBPs). Such rules were part of
the rejected 1948 Havana Charter for an international trade organization.' A
United Nations committee under the Economic and Social Council (ECO-
SOC) in 1952 formulated another code, combined with an investigation and
consultation procedure. It too was rejected. 2 The General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) explored this issue in the middle 1950s in an effort
to formulate agreed rules on the topic, but it was not deemed feasible to apply
the GATT system, which was designed to regulate the trade policies of gov-
ernments, to the practices of private enterprises. The effort culminated in
1960 in a simple consultation resolution which has never been used.'
Even national RBP laws, or antitrust laws as the United States calls them,
have occasioned strenuous business objection and academic criticism. Busi-
ness has argued that the anti-bigness tendency of such laws is inconsistent with
the achievement of national growth and expansion, and with the formation
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of combinations large enough to compete in world markets. Some econo-
mists have argued that such laws, though justified when aimed against mono-
polistic cartels, have no strong economic basis when they interfere with distri-
bution methods of nondominant firms, with mergers, or with patent
licensing." Nevertheless, the antitrust doctrine has spread. It has appealed not
only to lawmakers favoring free competition and free trade, but also to those
trying to fight inflation and to those trying to reduce what they perceive to be
the abusive power of the dominant transnational enterprises. Now, 90 per-
cent of all developed countries, and about half of the larger developing na-
tions, have antitrust laws of some sort, or use antitrust rules as part of invest-
ment or technology screening.' But, perhaps as many as a hundred small
countries in the world have no such laws at all.
The application of any one nation's antitrust laws to international trade or
investment has almost always engendered controversy. The application of
the United States antitrust laws to foreign cartels has led to diplomatic pro-
tests, blocking legislation, and claims that such assertions of jurisdiction
violate international law.6 Switzerland has imprisoned one of its citizens for
giving information of antitrust violations to the Common Market Competi-
tion Directorate, while South Africa threatens similar sanctions against its
citizens who aid the enforcement of a foreign antitrust law.' Also, the basic
premise of most antitrust or restrictive business practice laws, namely, that
free competition is the optimum means for encouraging innovation, effi-
ciency and growth, is fundamentally questioned by a very large number of
nations who prefer Marxist solutions or at least very heavy doses of state
capitalism, subsidization, and protectionism.
On the other hand, an international antitrust code has been urged, for
instance, by a UN Group of "Eminent Persons," as a means of defining
when the extraterritorial application of one nation's antitrust law is or is not
'See, e.g., R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF (1978), and R.
POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE (1976).
'See Control of Restrictive Practices in Transfer of Technology Transactions, U.N. Doc. TD/
AC. I / 17 (1978); White, Recent Developments in the Control of Restrictive Business Practices in
Latin America, U.N. Doc. TD/B/C.2/AC.6/17 (1978); OECD, GUIDE TO LEGISLATION ON RE-
STRICTIVE BUSINESS PRACTICES, (4th ed. Supp. 1978).
'See Note, Discovery of Documents Located Abroad in U.S. Antitrust Litigation: Recent
Developments in the Law Concerning the Foreign Illegality Excuse for Non-Production, 14 VA.
J. INT'L L. 747 (1974); INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF THE FIFTY-FIRST CON-
FERENCE HELD AT TOKYO 565-592 (1965) (collection of diplomatic protests).
'The Competition Directorate case referred to was the Hoffman La Roche Vitamins case.
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Swiss Criminal Code but this contention was rejected in a decision of the Commission. 76/642/
EEC of 9 June 1976. The informant was prosecuted in absentia by the Swiss government. The
case is discussed in J. Lever, Aspects of Jurisdictional Conflict in the Field of Discovery (Nov.
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(June 22, 1962), as amended by Second General Law Amendment Act No. 94 of 1974 (Nov. II,
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justified, and obviating the need for unilateralism. Also, Marxist nations
have viewed negotiations on international restrictive business practice rules
as a fairly safe way to join with developing countries in complaining about
"exploitation" by capitalist enterprises and demanding elimination of re-
straints on sales to socialist states or on their ability to export products manu-
factured with the aid of developed country enterprises.
I. UNCTAD Preparatory Work
It was in this ambivalent context that the United Nations General As-
sembly decided in the winter of 1978, with surprising unanimity, to convene a
UN conference to complete work on agreed principles and rules concerning
the control of restrictive business practices.' In the fall of 1979, a diplomatic
conference was held under the auspices of the United Nations Conference on
Trade and Development (UNCTAD). This conference represents the UN
effort in the RBP field with the greatest chance of success to date. The con-
ference will be the culmination of five years of work by three committees of
experts.'" In 1974, an ad hoc committee of experts acting in personal capaci-
ties formulated an initial report on restrictive business practices with a tenta-
tive code of conduct for enterprises. This report was rejected by the Trade
and Development Board of the UN Conference on Trade and Development
as not sufficiently thorough and not representing important interests of gov-
ernments. Accordingly, UNCTAD authorized a second, and then a third, ad
hoc group of governmental experts, the latter working under a mandate
agreed to at the fourth UNCTAD conference in Nairobi." This mandate
included:
I. the identification of restrictive business practices likely to injure in-
ternational trade, particularly the trade and development of developing
countries;
2. the formulation of principles and rules to deal with such practices;
3. the development of systems for information exchange and collection;
and
4. the formulation of a model antitrust law for developing countries.
The ad hoc expert groups each met about six times over a two-year period,
until the mandate had largely been accomplished. An agreed list of restrictive
practices likely to be injurious to trade and development was identified. A
system for providing information to UNCTAD and for its dissemination in
'The Impact of Multinational Corporations on Development and International Relations.
U.N. Doc. E/5500/Rev. 1, ST/ESA/6 (1974). See generally Coonrod, The United Nations Code
of Conduct for Transnational Corporations, 18 HARV. INT'L L. J. 273 (1977).
'G. A. Res. 33/153 (Dec. 20, 1978).
'"For reports of the three ad hoc committees see U.N. Doc. TD/B/C.2/119/Rev. I (1974);
U.N. Doc. TD/B/600, TD/B/C.2/166, TD/B/C.2/AC.5/6 (1976); U.N. Doc. TD/B/C.2/
AC.6/18 (1978).
"UNCTAD Res. 93 (IV), May 30, 1976.
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an annual report on developments in antitrust legislation and enforcement
was created and a first draft of a model antitrust law was completed. In April
1979, a substantial set of principles and rules was completed at the expert
level, though with a dozen or so bracketed texts representing unresolved
differences between group positions, some of which were believed to be suffi-
ciently serious that they could only be resolved at a diplomatic level con-
ference.
I!. The Text as Negotiated by the Experts
The final document produced by the experts has the impressive title, "A
Set of Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Principles and Rules for the Control
of Restrictive Business Practices Having Adverse Effects on International
Trade, Particularly That of Developing Countries, and on the Economic
Development of These Countries." The document is in a textual sense much
more detailed and comprehensive than anything previously attempted inter-
nationally in this field. It contains almost fifty provisions, directed both at
enterprises and governments.
A. Objectives
The first section sets forth five agreed objectives of the restrictive business
practice rules. In summary, these objectives include ensuring that RBP's do
not interfere with trade liberalization, encouraging efficiency through the
creation and protection of competition, promoting consumer interests,
eliminating disadvantages which may result from RBPs by transnational cor-
porations and other enterprises, and providing rules which can be emulated
at national and regional levels.
B. Definitions and Scope of Application
Three terms are defined. Restrictive business practices is defined as acts or
agreements which through an abuse of a dominant position of market power,
limit access to markets or otherwise unduly restrain competition, having or
being likely to have adverse effects on international trade, particularly of
developing countries and on the economic development of those countries.
Dominant position of market power is defined as a situation where an en-
terprise, alone or with a few others, is in a position to control the relevant
market. Enterprises is defined to include all forms of partnerships or cor-
porations, whether created or controlled by states or not, which are engaged
"See UNCTAD ANNUAL REPORT ON LEGISLATIVE AND OTHER DEVELOPMENTS IN DEVELOPED
AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN THE CONTROL OF RESTRICTIVE BUSINESS PRACTICES, U.N. Doc.
TD/B/C.2/AC.6/15 (1978); First Draft of a Model Law or Laws on Restrictive Business Prac-
tices to Assist Developing Countries in Devising Appropriate Legislation, U.N. Doc. TD/B/
C.2/AC.6/16 (1978); Report of the Third Ad Hoc Group of Experts on Restrictive Business
Practices on Its Sixth Session, U.N. Doc. TD/250, TD/B/C.2/201, TD/B/C.2/AC.6/20
(1979).
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in commercial activities, and including their branches, subsidiaries or affili-
ates.
Each of the three definitions reflects an element of compromise achieved
by an ambiguity which is potentially controversial. The definition of restric-
tive business practices stresses effect on trade and development, especially of
developing countries. This suggests that adverse effect on developing coun-
tries is a test in determining whether conduct is a restrictive business practice.
However, the better reading appears to be that the definition does not define
any offense, since those are defined in a later section which does not contain
an agreed "catchall" offense. Even within the definition, it should be noted
that there is no word or preceding the reference to having an adverse effect on
trade and development. Thus, the definition must be read to state that an
offense exists when a practice abuses a dominant position by limiting access
to markets or unduly restraining competition and such practice has an ad-
verse effect on trade or development.
The definition of dominant position of market power is controversial be-
cause of its reference to enterprises which not only alone, but also "with a few
others," are in a position to control a relevant market. This reference to
"shared" or "joint" monopolization is entirely consistent with existing
Common Market and German law regarding dominant position," but is not
a well-settled point under laws such as the American or Canadian antitrust
statutes." Nevertheless, the effect of the provision is actually rather conser-
vative, since nothing in the principles and rules defines being a member of a
shared monopoly as an offense in itself. In the rules for enterprise, a number
of practices, such as price discrimination and tying arrangements, are listed
as being objectionable when abusive of a dominant position of market power
in a relevant market. Thus, the effect of the substantive provision combined
with the definitions is to create a rule that offenses like price discrimination
and tying arrangements are objectionable only when engaged in by one of the
leading firms dominating an industry. In a number of national jurisdictions,
such as the United States, these practices could be illegal even when engaged
in by a nondominant firm. On the other hand, if the definition of dominant
position were limited to situations of single-firm dominance or multifirm
conspiracy, practices like price discrimination or tying would become objec-
"See generally Schroter, Le Concept de Position Dominante dans I' Application de Articles
66, paragraphe 7 du Traite CECA et 86 Traite CEE, in LA REGLEMENTATION DU COMPORTEMENT
DES MONOPOLES ET ENTREPRISES DOMINANTES EN DROIT COMMUNAUTAIRE 459 (J. Van Damme
ed. 1977); Markert, The New German Antitrust Reform Law, 19 ANTITRUST BULL. 135 (1974).
"For studies on oligolopy under United States law see, e.g., 3 P. AREEDA & TURNER, ANTI-
TRUST LAW § 840, at 359 (1978); Posner, Oligopoly and the Antitrust Laws: A Suggested Ap-
proach, 21 STAN. L. REV. 1562 (1969); Markovits, Oligopolistic Pricing Suits, the Sherman Act
and Economic Welfare, 26 STAN. L. REV. 493 (1974). The views of the Department of Justice can
be found in a recent address by Ky Ewing, Remarks on Shared Monopoly and Concentration,
(Dec. I, 1978) (address before the Practicing Law Institute, New York, New York). Mr. Ewing is
Deputy Assistant Attorney General of the Antitrust Division. For Canadian law see Consumer
and Corporate Affairs Canada, Proposals for a New Competition Policy for Canada, Second
Stage at 45 (1977).
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tionable only when engaged in by a monopolist or when there was a con-
spiracy among leading firms to each engage in the practice. This would be a
rule substantially more conservative than the law in any major country.' 5
The definition of enterprise ends with the reference to inclusion of branch-
es, subsidiaries, and affiliates. The ambiguity concerns whether the intended
meaning was, on the one hand, that all branches, subsidiaries, and affiliates
are separate "enterprises" for purposes of the principles and rules, or
whether, on the other hand, each enterprise is addressed by the principles and
rules so as to include its branches, subsidiaries, and affiliates. The developing
countries favor the former interpretation, while certain developed countries,
particularly the United States, favor the latter.' 6 A technical aspect of this
dispute turns on whether an unincorporated branch should be treated as an
enterprise for purposes of the principles and rules, given that in most legal
systems it could not be treated as a separate entity.'' The broader issue con-
cerns the implication which the definition could have on the question whether
an agreement between a parent and subsidiary, or between two closely affili-
ated firms, could or should be viewed as a cartel arrangement violative of the
rules for enterprises. It seems doubtful that an issue of this significance will
be fully resolved simply by means of ambiguities or nuances in a general
definition. The sections dealing with exceptions, scope of application, and
rules for enterprises will undoubtedly have to address the intraenterprise is-
sue in more specific and practical terms.
The next section, dealing with scope of application, stresses that the princi-
ples and rules apply to all enterprises and all types of transactions, and are
universally applicable to all countries and enterprises regardless of the parties
involved. The principles and rules apply to all acts and practices having the
requisite bad effects, regardless of whether such practices involve enterprises
in one or more countries. Scope of application is an area in which some of the
most fundamental disagreements in the code are also evident. The developed
countries' (Group B) text would exempt from the principles and rules all
enterprise conduct which, under applicable national legislation or regula-
tions, is exempted from restrictive business practice law. The developing
countries (Group of 77) would exempt only activities which developing coun-
tries, under their legislation, determine are essential for their economic devel-
opment or in defense of their primary commodities and economic resources.
In dissimilar positions which are somewhat closer in wording, Group B
would also exempt RBP's directly caused by sovereign acts of state or autho-
"See, e.g., OECD, RESTRICTIVE BUSINESS PRACTICES RELATING TO TRADEMARKS (1978).
'See Davidow, The United States, Developing Countries and the Issue of Intra-Enterprise
Agreements, 7 GA. J. INT'L L. 507 (1977); Joelson, The Proposed International Codes of Con-
duct as Related to Restrictive Business Practices, 8 L. & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 837, 848-52, 861-69
(1976).
"in the definition section of the UNCTAD Transfer of Technology Code, it is agreed that, in
addition to subsidiaries, affiliates, and joint ventures, an incorporated branch is also a party
subject to the rules. U.N. Doc. TD/CODE TOT/14 I I(a) at 3 (1979).
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rized by intergovernmental agreements among concerned countries. The
Group of 77 text would exempt only those restrictive business practices
caused by intergovernmental agreements negotiated within the auspices of
the United Nations.
Lastly, a text in the scope of applications chapter, supported only by the
Group B countries, would state that principles and rules for enterprises shall
not apply to restrictions between a parent and subsidiary company unless
those restrictions constitute an abuse of a dominant position of market power
within a relevant market, for instance, restrictions adversely affecting com-
petition outside the affiliated enterprises.
C. General Principles
A third section of the principles and rules sets forth general principles
which are agreed upon. These call for: action at regional, national, and in-
ternational levels to eliminate restrictive business practices; collaboration
between governments at bilateral and multilateral levels for this purpose;
creation of international mechanisms to facilitate exchange and dissemina-
tion of information among governments in regard to RBPs; and the creation
of means to facilitate the holding of multinational consultations relating to
RBPs and their control. The principle is also agreed that the provisions of the
rules should not be construed to justify conduct by enterprises which is un-
lawful under applicable national legislation. In the only disputed provisions
of this chapter, the Group of 77 favors the principle of according preferential
treatment to their national enterprises in order to ensure "equitable" appli-
cation of the principle rules. Group B's counteroffer is a provision stating
that account should be taken of special conditions or economic circum-
stances, particularly in developing countries, including the need for small-
and medium-sized enterprises to cooperate and combine sufficiently to en-
able them to compete in international markets.
D. Principles and Rules for Enterprises
Section D of the principles and rules sets forth principles and rules for
enterprises, including transnational corporations. It is undoubtedly the most
important section of the document. It provides, first, that enterprises should
conform to the RBP laws of the countries in which they operate. Second, it is
stated that enterprises should cooperate with competent authorities in such
countries, and in particular should provide information such as details of
restrictive arrangements required for RBP control. Information is to be pro-
vided even if it is located in foreign countries, unless such production is
prevented by the applicable law or established public policy of the country
where it is located.
Provision three deals with restrictive business practices of a cartel nature,
and states that enterprises should refrain from participating in:
(a) price-fixing;
(b) collusive tendering;
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(c) market or customer allocation;
(d) sales and production allocation;
(e) concerted refusals to deal;
(f) concerted refusal of supply to potential importers; and
(g) collective denial of access to an arrangement crucial to competition.
In addition, enterprises are enjoined not to fix the price at which goods
exported can be resold in importing countries, though Group B would pro-
hibit this "vertical" price-fixing only when unjustifiable, since resale price
maintenance is legally permitted in a number of developed countries.
The fourth provision of Section D sets forth seven practices which are
condemned when employed as an abuse of a dominant position of market
power in a relevant market. The Group of 77, however, notes in a bracket
that they would like the section extended to cover also acts or behavior "of
similar effects." The first three practices listed are:
1. predatory behavior toward competitors;
2. discriminatory pricing or terms or conditions in the supply or purchase
of products (the Group of 77 would extend this provision to cover exces-
sive pricing of products and services); and
3. mergers, takeovers, or joint ventures.
Four additional practices are listed, but are further qualified by a subheading
indicating that they are objectionable only when they are not engaged in for
ensuring the achievement of legitimate business purposes such as quality,
safety, adequate distribution or service. The four practices are:
(a) refusals to deal on customary commercial terms;
(b) exclusive dealing;
(c) customer or export restrictions; and
(d) tying arrangements.
In addition to the largely agreed upon Sections D(3) and D(4) dealing with
cartels and abuses of dominant position, there was some agreement at the
April 1979 negotiation on a parallel text for a new provision, Section D(5). It
was originally the view of the Group of 77 that separate provisions were
needed to deal with offenses thought to be peculiar to transnational corpora-
tions. Group B did not agree, however, that there were any such offenses that
would constitute RBPs in themselves. The compromise reached was the cre-
ation of a new Section D(5) to deal with additional offenses, but under a
heading applicable, like the others, to all enterprises, not just transnational
corporations. The Group of 77 text in this section would prohibit restrictive
business practices of the types mentioned in paragraphs three and four which
are achieved through the licensing of trademarks or trade names, the use of
marketing strategies to prevent or hinder imports or exports by related en-
terprises, or the use of transfer pricing to overcharge or undercharge for
products or services purchased or supplied. Group B's text in this regard
would apply to trademark restrictions only where they abuse a dominant
position by preventing the importation of genuine trademarked articles in
order to maintain an artificially high price in a particular market, and would
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apply to transfer pricing only in regard to use of discriminatory pricing trans-
actions between affiliated enterprises as a means of abusing a dominant posi-
tion of market power which adversely affects competition outside the related
enterprises. Group B took the position that the subject of export restrictions
was adequately dealt with in section D(4)(c), and thus offered no additional
text in Section D(5).
E. Principles for States
Sections E and F set out in substantial detail principles and rules which
States should follow at the national, regional, and subregional level. Provi-
sion E(l) of this section simply urges states to adopt and improve legislation
for the control of restrictive business practices. Provision E(2) states that
nations should base their legislation on the principle of eliminating acts or
behavior which abuse dominant positions, limit access to markets or
otherwise unduly restrain competition, and which have adverse effects on
trade or development. Provision E(3) instructs that when states do control
restrictive business practices, they should ensure treatment of enterprises
which is fair, equitable, and in accordance with established procedures of the
law, and that laws and regulations should be publicly and readily available.
Group B has so far insisted on additional language in the provision that
national RBP laws should be not only fair and equitable, but also "non-
discriminatory." The Group of 77 has refused to accept this.
Paragraph E(4) commits states to seek appropriate measures to prevent the
use of restrictive practices within their competence when it comes to their
attention that such practices adversely affect international trade and develop-
ment. Paragraph E(5) obligates states obtaining information from en-
terprises which contains legitimate business secrets to accord such informa-
tion reasonable safeguards normally applicable in this field.
There is a proposed paragraph E(6), supported only by Group B, which,
like the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
recommendation of 1967, would commit States contemplating enforcement
action that would affect important interests of other States to notify those
States of such action, preferably sufficiently in advance to facilitate consulta-
tion.
Paragraph E(7) is a particularly important and controversial text. It dic-
tates that States should take measures to prevent their legislation or adminis-
trative procedures from "fostering" the participation of enterprises in cartels
when such participation will cause a dominant position of market power
likely to have adverse effects on international trade or development. There
are two disagreements as to the wording of this provision. The Group of 77
would prefer that the provision be directed particularly at developed coun-
tries. Group B, on the other hand, would limit this provision to condemning
participation of enterprises in "international" cartels, thus arguably making
the provision inapplicable to export arrangements involving companies sell-
ing out of a single nation. Both the Group of 77 and the socialist countries of
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Group D have insisted that the provision should condemn both international
and national cartels. There is an interesting interpretative question concern-
ing the meaning of the phrase "foster the participation." Group B nations
might well argue that a simple decision on their part to make their domestic
restrictive business practice legislation inapplicable to pure export cartels
does not "foster" the participation of their enterprises in such cartels, but
simply means that the state is neutral in that regard.
The next provision, paragraph E(8), suggests that States should institute
notification procedures for obtaining such information from enterprises as is
necessary for the control of restrictive business practices. Provision E(9)
urges States which are members of regional economic integration arrange-
ments to eliminate all restrictive business practices impeding the free flow of
goods in their common market. However, there is disagreement over the
second sentence in this provision. In it, the Group of 77 stress that economic
integration arrangements among developed countries should not include pol-
icies which impede improved access for exports of developing countries.
Group B, and in particular the representatives of the European Communi-
ties, have denied that such policies exist, and have been unwilling to agree to
such a principle. Provision E(1O) suggests the creation of mechanisms at
regional levels to promote exchange of information on restrictive business
practices and to assist in their control.
The Group of 77 would add an eleventh provision urging that States in
economic integration groups should ensure that such arrangements do not
facilitate the use of restrictive business practices by enterprises in the region
or abroad which would adversely affect the trade and development of devel-
oping countries. This provision is not accepted by Group B.
Provision E(12) commits States with greater expertise in the control of
restrictive business practices to, on request, share their experience with, or
otherwise provide technical assistance to, other States wishing to develop
such systems. Last, in this section a thirteenth provision urges States, on
request or at their own initiative, to supply publicly available information,
and possibly other information, necessary to a requesting, interested State
for its control of restrictive business practices.
F. International Measures
Section G of the principles and rules deals with international measures.
This section urges collaboration at the international level. Provision G(l)
suggests that a first priority should be achieving common approaches in na-
tional policies relating to restrictive business practices. Section G(2) deals
with the subject of exceptions concerning restrictive business practices, but
the approaches of the two major groups are at variance. The Group of 77
would require that the Secretary General of UNCTAD be notified of all
exceptions stemming from national law and permitted under the principles
and rules. Group B suggests merely that laws and exceptions regarding re-
strictive business practices be available for exchange among nations. This
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difference reflects Group B reluctance at the expert level to commit so much
authority to UNCTAD, as well as Group B's position that exceptions to the
principles should be generally coincident with exceptions in national law
rather than dependent on special approval in the principles and rules or by
UNCTAD. Provision G(3) states that the United Nations should publish an
annual report on restrictive business practice developments based upon offi-
cial reports from member countries and other reliable material. This provi-
sion, based on an early recommendation of the experts, has actually been in
effect for two years, with one annual report already having been published'
and another expected to be issued soon.
The most substantial provision of section G is the fourth, which is a par-
tially agreed procedure for consultation in situations where a State, particu-
larly a developing country, believes that bilateral diplomacy is appropriate in
regard to an issue concerning control of restrictive business practices, and
requests consultation. States agree to give full consideration to such requests,
and, upon agreement as to subject matter and procedures, to consult in good
faith. It is then stated that where a satisfactory conclusion is reached, and if
the States involved so agree, a report on the matter should be made available
to interested States or international organizations. The Group of 77, in
bracketed language, would stress that the Secretary General of UNCTAD,
upon request of a member, should be empowered to convene such consulta-
tions and to prepare and distribute reports concerning them. The Group of 77
would also provide that upon agreement of such States, any unresolved mat-
ter arising out of a consultation on restrictive business practices should be
brought to the Trade and Development Board of UNCTAD in order that it
consider what further action might be taken to resolve the issue. Group B
opposed any such additional procedure and took the position that any deci-
sion to create additional responsibilities for UNCTAD should be made at the
diplomatic rather than expert level.
Provision G(5) of the international measures sets forth an eight point tech-
nical assistance program. The recommendations are:
a) a model RBP law should be elaborated within UNCTAD;
b) experts should be provided upon request to developing countries to help
them formulate or improve RBP legislation and procedures;
c) the training programs should be held, primarily, in developing coun-
tries, to train officials in the control of restrictive business practices;
d) a handbook on restrictive business practice laws and regulations should
be compiled;
e) books and documents relevant to restrictive business practices should
be collected and made available, particularly to developing countries;
f) exchanges of personnel in the field of restrictive business practice con-
trol should be arranged;
"UNCTAD Annual Report, supra note 12.
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g) international conferences on the subject should be held; and
h) seminars for an exchange of views on restrictive business practices
among persons in the public and private sectors should be arranged.
G. Implementation and/or Further International Work
Section H, as proposed by the Group of 77, deals with implementation of
the principles and rules. The section provides, first, that States should imple-
ment the agreed provisions by means of appropriate national legislation and
regulation: The second provision would commit States to the creation of a
permanent mechanism within UNCTAD to monitor implementation and to
make proposals for possible revisions or improvements of the principles and
rules. It is interesting to note that these provisions do not presume a legally
binding code. The suggestion that States "should" implement it through
national legislation is obviously not mandatory. The creation of a monitoring
committee falls far short of any kind of adjudicatory or enforcement author-
ity. Nevertheless, Group B at this time has not been willing to agree at the
expert level to even this degree of implementation. The developed countries
adhered strictly to their voluntary guidelines approach, supporting in Section
H only a modest proposal that there be further international work in the form
of periodic meetings among RBP enforcement officials to confer on matters
of policy and share experience.
II!. Unresolved Issues
In its closing statement at the last experts' meeting prior to the UN con-
ference, the Group of 77 expressed satisfaction that nearly all drafting issues
capable of agreement at the expert level had been resolved. They then listed
five policy questions which they believed were not solvable at the expert level
and which would thus be crucial issues at the diplomatic negotiation. These
were:
I. exceptions from the rules for enterprises;
2. special treatment for national enterprises of developing countries;
3. applicability of the rules for enterprises to intra-enterprise transactions;
4. the role of UNCTAD in future work or implementation; and
5. the legal nature and effect of the principles and rules.'9
The Group B countries largely agreed that this was an accurate listing of
the remaining issues, but did not fully agree that exceptions, special treat-
ment or intraenterprise transactions were political issues as opposed to legal
or practical issues. The United States delegation argued that it would be
unfeasible as well as undesirable to limit exceptions to RBP rules only to
enterprises of developing countries. Exemptions for labor unions, farmer
cooperatives, sport leagues, and the like are extremely widespread and well
'See Report of the Third Ad Hoc Group, supra note 12, at 35.
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accepted. Moreover, the very purpose of an exemption could be lost by deny-
ing it to some enterprises.
Similarly, Group B delegates have insisted that special and preferential
treatment based on nationality is not feasible in the RBP field, since the
members of a cartel, or its victims, may be from both developed and develop-
ing countries, depending on where products are mined, manufactured, or
consumed. Group B countries have been prepared to accept the concept that
a less developed country should have fewer obligations in regard to those
principles and rules which involve financial or technical burdens, but assert
that any special treatment for enterprises should turn on their lack of size and
market power, not their nationality. It seems likely, though not yet certain,
that a compromise along these lines can be achieved at the diplomatic con-
ference.
The issue of whether and to what extent to apply rules for enterprises to
intraenterprise restrictions has political overtones, since many, nations are
suspicious that any "exemption" in this regard would involve favoritism for
transnational corporations (TNCs) and would prevent the principles and
rules from serving as a check on abuses of the economic power of such firms.
This view, however, is largely based on a misunderstanding of the position of
the Group B experts, and of their reasons for that position. Developed coun-
try RBP experts have agreed that all rules for enterprises-rules against price-
fixing, tying arrangements, and the like-are fully and expressly applicable
to TNC's when such firms fix prices with competing firms or force tied prod-
ucts or services on independent buyers. It is also clear that the Group B
experts would have the rules apply when a TNC acts abusively through a
subsidiary or affiliate to produce adverse competitive effects outside the
group or entrench a dominant market position.
Group B's reluctance to agree to prohibitory rules which appear to con-
demn restrictive arrangements purely between parent and subsidiary or
among affiliates is based on four important considerations: First, the Group
B position supports international rules based on laws and enforcement poli-
cies in major jurisdictions. In that regard, the European Court of Justice, in
Centrafarm B V v. Sterling Drug, Inc. ,0 and the United States Antitrust Divi-
sion, in its Antitrust Guide for International Operations,2 have concluded
that a parent company's control of its subsidiaries' purchases or sales, or
allocation of functions with or among them, should not be treated as an
objectionable conspiracy in restraint of trade. Second, there is the practical
consideration, noted in the OECD experts' report concerning RBP's of
multinational enterprises, that the opposite rule would "force upon competi-
tion authorities the impracticable task of seeking to create and maintain com-
2
"Centrafarm BV v. Sterling Drug, Inc., [1974] C.J. Comm. E. Rec. 114, _ Comm. Mkt.
L.R. 480.
"U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST GUIDE FOR INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS 25-26 (1977).
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petition within a single enterprise on an ongoing basis."' 2 Third, the full
applicability approach is objectionable on logical grounds because it would
produce absurd results. If the president of an American firm which sells
tractors is also president of its Yugoslav subsidiary, is he guilty of "price-
fixing" if he sets the same price in both countries? Is he guilty of exclusive
dealing if he agrees with himself to buy parts only from the parent company?
Fourth, a rule requiring parent companies to refrain from controlling the
sales and purchasing policies of foreign subsidiaries they create would
amount to a de facto expropriation of control, and would have the likely
effect of discouraging useful forms of direct foreign investment.
The developing countries, although generally unwilling to support binding
international rules so strong as to interfere with their own sovereignly and
economic policies, have nevertheless pressed for a scope of application and
method of implementation more ambitious than would be preferred by the
developed nations. Some developing countries have favored "legally bind-
ing" international rules. This appears to mean that the final document would
be in the form of a convention, and that nations would be obligated to con-
form their national law to achieve the rules of the convention. However,
there have been many problems with this approach. It is not entirely clear
how a developed country, particularly one that is the home country of many
multinational enterprises, could enact and enforce legislation to govern the
conduct of its enterprises around the world in transactions which may have
no direct connection to its own commerce. It also seems clear that most
countries are quite unwilling to agree to such a system. Another problem with
the legal convention approach is that developing countries have not been
prepared to have similar binding rules apply to their national enterprises or
their agreements regarding primary commodities. In the most recent political
statements offered by developing countries on this issue, references to the
legal nature of the document have been so vague as to suggest a retreat from
an earlier position of supporting a binding code of conduct in this field.
Although neither the legal nature nor the implementation scheme for the
principles and rules has been agreed to, most of the outcomes in this area now
seem predictable. It is highly unlikely that the rules will be adopted in binding
treaty form. The opposition to that is very strong and exists not only through-
out Group B but also among the Group D countries and, as noted, among
some of the more advanced nations of the Group of 77. On the other hand, it
seems likely that modest forms of implementation, followup, and consulta-
tion procedures will be adopted. Such a system was adopted by the OECD
countries in regard to their multinational guidelines of 1976, and has oper-
ated satisfactorily, though at very minimum levels of activity. A similar sys-
tem of having an UNCTAD committee follow up on the guidelines has
emerged in the negotiation of the Transfer of Technology Code of Conduct.
A bilateral consultation procedure, which could form part of the implemen-
tation process, has, as noted, already been largely accepted as part of the
restrictive business practice principles and rules.
22OECD, RESTRICTIVE BUSINESS PRACTICES OF MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES 59 (1977).
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IV. The Exercise in Perspective
In evaluating the significance of the antitrust principles and rules being
negotiated, it is well to keep in mind how modest they are in conception. The
Treaty of Rome, which extends to the nine member-nations of the European
Communities, is perhaps the most comprehensive system for enforcing free
trade and free competition on an international scale. That treaty creates a
common market, that is, a customs union and a free trade zone; forbids
actions of States which would restrict free trade or competition in the zone;
limits subsidization of industries or exports by States; applies strong antitrust
rules to agreements or single firm abuses likely to injure trade and competi-
tion within the zone; and entrusts the enforcement of the competition rules to
an autonomous, multinational commission with powers to seize documents
from the premises of corporations, to demand accurate answers to interroga-
tories, and to levy fines on those who violate the rules. The treaty provides for
an international court in Luxembourg to which all significant issues of in-
terpretation of the competition rules are to be referred.23
There is no international system capable of achieving global free trade to
the extent that the EEC has achieved it on a regional basis. Although the
principles of GATT embody free trade concepts, the GATT and MTN permit
exceptions in the form of tariffs and other trade barriers,2" and developing
countries have complained that the GATT actually favors developed coun-
tries, particularly in regard to rules relating to subsidization and other safe-
guard measures.2" Yet, except for the existence of the GATT, the untried
antitrust rules would not be complemented by any guarantees of free trade.
The UNCTAD rules are not intended to regulate the domestic industrial
policies of States, their subsidization of industries or hindering of foreign
competition, or the creation of state monopolies. Further, although there is
some consideration of creating a committee within UNCTAD with limited
monitoring duties, no regional group participating in the RBP negotiation
has recommended, or seems likely to support, the creation of an enforcement
agency at the international level with powers at all comparable to those of the
European Communities Commission at Brussels. Nor does there seem any
likelihood that the member states of UNCTAD are prepared to create a new
international court for RBP's, or to refer antitrust decisions to the Interna-
tional Court of Justice at the Hague.
In analyzing what international antitrust rules ought to accomplish, or can
accomplish, one should remember that different types of restrictive business
practices will create lesser or greater conflicts of national interest. Presum-
ably, nations will favor or implement strict rules only when their interests in
23See generally Davidow & Chiles, The United States and the Issue of the Binding or Voluntary
Nature of International Codes of Conduct Regarding Restrictive Business Practices, 72 AM.J.
INT'L L. 247 (1978).
"See generally Jackson, The Crumbling Institutions of the Liberal Trade System, 12 J.
WORLD TRADE L. 93 (1978).
"See J. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT § 25.7 (1969).
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eliminating certain practices actually coincide. However, nations will tend to
disagree when their export or import interests are at stake. They also tend to
differ concerning the objectionability of the fact that a restrictive arrange-
ment was made without government approval or participation. Some States,
particularly the United States, would generally take the position that an
agreement restraining trade and competition made without government ap-
proval is an evil regardless of whether the restraint was in fact harmless, or
even arguably in the national interest. 6 Other States would have very little
bias against private trade restraints per se, evaluating them after the fact in
terms of their effects. The United States approach presents some difficulties
in a few situations, but it has the very significant advantage in the context of
an international code that it tends to be neutral in application, and relatively
easy to interpret and administer. Examination of a few examples may clarify
these points.
At one extreme, if an enterprise in one State agrees with its leading poten-
tial competitor in another State that each will stay out of the other's national
market, international trade between those two states is restrained. Assuming
that neither State had approved the contract and that both would prefer free
trade to private restraint, either State would have an interest in assisting
prosecution of the conspiracy by the other, or in agreeing to some form of
international condemnation of the arrangement. The situation becomes a bit
more complex if, for instance, an enterprise of State A licenses or contracts
with an enterprise of State B to produce or distribute there, but not to export
to State C. State A might favor the restriction as protecting exports of its
enterprise to State C, while States B and C might be opposed to it. Some-
times, however, State B might have accepted the restriction in exchange for
other favorable aspects of the licensing or distribution arrangement. In that
instance, State B would not be expected to favor an international system
under which State C could cast doubt on the legitimacy of the transaction.
Commonality of interest is more difficult to find when enterprises in coun-
try A or, perhaps, in countries A and B, agree to raise prices to a uniform level
in sales to consumers of country C. The facts can be further complicated by
laws in countries A or B exempting or approving such joint selling in export
markets. Given these facts, there seems to be far more conflict of interest
than coincidence of interest. Countries A and B become richer and more
successful as the restrictive business practice continues; they lose revenues
and balance of trade if it is prevented. The primary argument for reaching
agreement to prevent such export cartels would be that the alternative is
export warfare under which nations producing the same commodities or
manufactures have an interest in joining together, directly or through their
enterprises, to raise the price of such products to all buyers who are not
members of the cartel. This is a powerful argument, with some basis in cur-
rent experience, but it has been difficult to devise a fair and equitable princi-
2 Carnation Co. v. Pac. Westbound Conference, 383 U.S. 213 (1966).
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pie concerning what should be condemned and what allowed. An all-
inclusive condemnation of export cartels ignores the fact that many export
associations lack market power and exist merely to achieve minor economies
of scale in selling abroad. Moreover, such a condemnation would not affect
other practices, such as merger of exporting firms or government-controlled
export, which eliminate export competition even more effectively than does
an export association.
Thus, the strong probability that nations will find themselves in major
conflicts of economic interest in regard to certain RBPs they have allowed or
facilitated makes it unrealistic to expect international rules to provide any
decisive solutions. Such rules can at most increase the tendencies toward
uniformity of approaches, and provide a framework for consultation of a
flexible nature.
For developed countries, the basic conception of the UNCTAD restrictive
business practice exercise as a whole has been essentially that "the process is
the product." Experts of western and other developed nations have believed,
based on their own OECD experience, that one-time, international agree-
ments with hard and fast rules are not at present a feasible method of dealing
with restrictive business practices in all their contexts. Rather, it is believed
that a gradual exchange of information and experience, comparison of legis-
lation and enforcement, and development of common norms based on ma-
jority approaches will, over time, serve an educational role, develop personal
contacts between antitrust experts in different countries, facilitate bilateral
cooperation and consultation, and create bases for further work, particularly
at the regional level.
Developing countries have been unsatisfied with this gradual approach for
a number of reasons. Most important, they believe that their general situa-
tion is one of crisis, with change being urgent, so that immediate and substan-
tial action is called for. Also, as a practical matter, they doubt that they have
the experts or the funds to keep up a working committee on a technical
subject like antitrust over a long series of international meetings held at a
distant point like Geneva. Thus, for them, both politics and practicality mili-
tate in favor of a "quick fix" approach rather than the building block ap-
proach with which OECD countries are more comfortable.
It should also be noted that the agreed principles and rules for enterprises
may not even have the effect of serving as a model law. The reason for this is
the existence of a separate UNCTAD document entitled A Model Antitrust
Law for Developing Countries. It seems clear that the proposed UN transfer
of technology code of conduct, for instance, .would, if promulgated, have
certain model law implications; that is, it is likely that countries with no law
on the subject might well enact legislation based on the code, or insist, ad-
ministratively, that technology transfers to their country be in accordance
with the structures of the code. Similar uses for the restrictive business prac-
tice principles seem somewhat less likely, both because of the existence of a
separate RBP model law and because cartel or anticartel principles are not
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used to shape individual commercial transactions as often as technology
transfer rules are.
It is significant that the model restrictive business practices law of
UNCTAD was written by the secretariat and experts employed by them,
rather than by the governmental experts who negotiated the principles and
rules. In fact, experts from developed countries have been quite critical of the
model restrictive business practice law. They found fault with its emphasis on
notification of a great variety of agreements, its stringent provisions in regard
to price discrimination, transfer pricing and excessive pricing, and its unusual
provisions limiting internal growth of dominant firms.27 A technical dispute
has arisen concerning the model law, with the developing countries arguing
that a model intended specifically for them should be completed in UNCTAD
meetings attended only by their experts, while developed country experts
stood by the principle that all UNCTAD work should be open to every mem-
ber.
Conclusion
There are two long-run goals which best justify the time, effort, and ex-
pense involved in negotiating the RBP principles and rules. The first is to
achieve standards for the conduct of enterprises in their international trade
and investment, particularly vis-a-vis developing countries, that will lessen
tension on both sides and frame disputes into objectively resolvable issues.
The second is to transform the UN and UNCTAD from political "wailing
walls" into practical institutions for the development of acceptable norms
and the facilitation of the resolution of disputes on a basis that is fair and
equitable to all concerned.
Epilogue
Between November 19 and December 7, 1979, the First United Nations
Conference on Restrictive Business Practices Principles and Rules was held in
Geneva. The Conference made progress but did not result in a final agree-
ment. The Conference will reconvene, with a good chance of success at that
time. The most important progress of the recent session was in achieving
agreement that the code would have very modest legal effects, at least in the
initial stages. The developing countries and the Socialist bloc finally agreed to
the Western position that the code should not be in treaty form, but rather
should be embodied at most in a United Nations General Assembly resolu-
tion. It was also agreed that implementation and follow-up of the code would
be accomplished by committee meetings in Geneva for the purpose of ex-
changing and discussing experience in this area and under the codes, but that
the committee should not pass judgment on the behavior of any particular
enterprise or government, nor become involved in any current dispute.
"See Report of the Third Ad Hoc Group, supra note 12, at 49-53, 56-57.
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The problem of how to apply international restrictive business practices
rules to parent-subsidiary relationships was a central element in the negotia-
tion. Late in the negotiation, the Chairman of the Conference produced a
text stating that the section dealing with horizontal offenses would apply only
to arrangements between enterprises "not under common control," but that
the section dealing with abuses of a dominant position would apply to parent-
subsidiary conduct, subject to a footnote indicating that the listed restrictive
practices might be non-abusive if "appropriate in light of the legal, organiza-
tional or managerial relationship of the enterprises involved." The Con-
ference adjourned before it could be determined whether this compromise
was acceptable to the developing countries, or to the Socialist bloc, who
thought that the rules should either be tougher on parent-subsidiary rela-
tions, easier on state enterprises, or both.
The Chairman's proposed compromise text contained interesting and po-
tentially acceptable approaches on the difficult issues of exceptions and spe-
cial treatment for developing countries. It was proposed that there should be
a complete exception only for intergovernmental agreements. Enterprise
conduct allowed under national law would be subject to the voluntary princi-
ples and rules, with a caveat that due account should be taken of the extent to
which conduct had been excepted or exempted, balanced against a statement
that exemptions from national law should be as narrow and short-lived as
possible. In regard to "special treatment," the Chairman proposed that
states enforcing RBP laws should take due account of the trade, development
and financial needs of developing countries, when these were reflected in
policies allowing certain consolidation or cooperation of enterprises. Thus,
the Chairman skirted these controversial issues by stressing that full excep-
tions were not necessary in a voluntary code and relying on the principle of
comity, i.e., that states should take due account of the important interests of
other states before exercising jurisdiction, which concept has gained favor in
the United States in recent antitrust decisions and in policy statements by the
Justice Department.
The first United Nations Conference on Restrictive Business Practices
highlighted a brace or ironies. First, the text as negotiated moved closer and
closer to United States and Common Market antitrust rules and approaches,
while at the same time the developing countries were prepared to declare that
control of international RBPs was an objective of the "New International
Economic Order." The second irony was that as Western antitrust officials
and developing country diplomats neared agreement on antitrust principles
and rules, the major parties opposing the code were the United States busi-
ness community and the Soviet Union, for completely opposite reasons. It
thus remains questionable, just as Corwin Edwards predicted, that intense
negotiation or careful drafting can fully overcome profound differences in
political and economic perceptions.

